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Abstract 
Up until recently Peak Oil was a major discussion point crossing from academic 
research into mainstream journalism, yet it now attracts far less interest. This paper 
evaluates the reasons for this and on-going relevance of Peak Oil, considering 
variations in predictive dates for the phenomenon supported by technological, 
economic and political issues. Using data from agencies, the validity of each 
position is assessed looking at reserves, industrial developments and alternative 
fuels. The complicating issue of demand is also considered. 
The conclusions are that, supported by commercial interests, an unsubstantiated 
belief in market and technical solutions, and a narrow paradigmatic focus, critics of 
Peak Oil theory have used unreliable reserve data, optimistic assumptions about 
utilisation of unconventional supplies and unrealistic predictions for alternative 
energy production to discredit the evidence that the resource-limited peak in the 
world’s production of conventional oil has arrived, diverting discussion from what 
should be a serious topic for energy policy: how we respond to decreasing supplies 
of one of our most important energy sources. 
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1. Introduction 
Peak oil is the point at which the global output of conventional oil reaches its 
maximum level and subsequently flow rates decrease (Bowden, 1985). This is when 
roughly half the world supply of oil has been produced and subsequent output falls. 
It is an important topic since oil is critical to the global economy, providing the 
ingredients for a range of manufactured goods and essential chemicals as well as 
supplying most of the energy for transportation, ensuring the operation of modern 
extended supply chains vital for international trade (Atkinson, 2010).  
Evidence for the concept of Peak Oil comes in part from the work of Shell Oil 
geologist M.K. Hubbert who predicted that US production would peak in 1970, 
closely matching actual peak production in 1971 (Bowden, 1985).  In 1974 he also 
suggested that global oil production would peak in 1995 which proved to be 
inaccurate (Demming, 2003). This approach was also developed separately through 
Shell scenarios in the seventies to examine the ‘Oil Mountain’, the point at which 
global supplies hit maximum output (Dumoulin and Eyre (1979). Now named Peak 
Oil, this is the time when all the cheapest oil has been extracted and costs rise, with 
serious ramifications for our oil-dependent industrialized societies built upon low 
energy costs.  
The intention of this paper is to collate opinions and the varying views on the date of 
Peak Oil and consider reasons for variations and the subsequent denial of the 
phenomenon by the many commentators, taking positions that have serious 
implications for policy.  
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2. Prediction of the date for Peak Oil 
There are a range of predictions as to when oil will peak and the groups can be 
largely split into those who believe in a late (or no) peak – the late-peak advocates
1
 – 
and those who suggest we have, or soon will peak – the early peak advocates. 
Though this categorisation does not include every commentator on the oil industry, 
it does encompass those who have voiced strong views on the topic and gives an 
overview of opinions. 
3. Late Peak advocates 
The late-peak advocates examined include the Cambridge Energy Research 
Associates (CERA), the International Energy Agency (IEA), BP, Shell, the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), the Energy Watch Group (EWG), Ged Davis, 
formerly of Shell, and Leonardo Maugeri, director of Strategies and Development at 
Eni SpA (table 1). Within this group there are wide variations with some dates close 
to those suggested by the early peak advocates. 
CERA (2008) believed there was no evidence of a sudden increase in oilfield decline 
rates before 2017, following on from more optimistic earlier work by CERA’s 
director Peter Jackson (2006) and Jackson and Esser (2004). Similarly BP's Tony 
Hayward did not believe there would be Peak Oil because of supply, though he 
suggested there may Peak Oil caused by demand (Macalister, 2010).  
                                                
1
 For simplicity, the title of the group has been set as late-peak rather than late-and-no-peak  
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IEA (2010) was not explicit on Peak Oil, but implicitly considered it, looking at 
alternatives energy policies for the future. Shell (2011) saw supply struggling to 
keep pace with demand by the end of the decade, developing the observations made 
by Shell senior manager Ged Davis (2003) where he expounded Shell’s Energy 
Needs, Choices and Possibilities—Scenarios to 2050 (2001). Shell’s New Lens 
Scenarios (2013) envisioned no peak under ‘Mountains’ scenario but saw oil 
demand ‘reaching a long plateau in the 2040s’ under the ‘Oceans’ scenario (Shell, 
2013, p33). 
 
Table 1: Summary of Dates for Late Peak 
Peak Oil date Source and Date of forecast 
Not before 2017 CERA (2008)  
After 2020 Hayward, T., BP (Macalister, 2010) 
After 2020 CERA (Jackson and Esser, 2004)  
2020 or beyond 2035 IEA (2010)  
2020 (for oil and gas) Shell (2011) 
2025 or later Davis (2003)  
2035 CERA (Jackson, 2006)  
Not before 2035 EIA (2010) 
No visible peak Maugeri (2012) 
No peak but 54.2 years of global production BP (2012) 
‘Peak oil theories have been abandoned’ 
‘Oil demand …reaching a long plateau in the 
2040s’ 
Mountains Scenario 
Oceans Scenario 
Shell (2013) 
Sources: varied given in references 
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EIA (2010) was more specific than others, proposing that there would be no peak 
before 2035 with production increases up until that date. This included both 
conventional and unconventional supplies. 
Maugeri (2012) considered the whole concept of Peak Oil as erroneous declaring 
that it ignored technological advances and the role of prices to spur innovation. 
Although BP also foresaw no evidence of a peak in supplies, the firm did point out 
that ‘oil reserves in 2011 were sufficient to meet 54.2 years of global production’ 
(BP, 2012, p7). 
4. Early peak advocates 
A more pessimistic view is provided by a number of proponents, many renowned for 
their staunch defence of Peak Oil predictions. Although there is some corroboration 
between dates there is no clear consensus (table 2). 
Professor Ken Deffeyes (2010), having written extensively on the topic, used 
calculations to show that the 2005 peak in world oil production would never be 
surpassed, now supported by Hallock’s recent review of his 2002 model (2013). 
Bakhtiari (2004) used simulations of the World Oil Production Capacity (Wocap) to 
propose global oil production peaking from 2006 to 2007. This was reinforced by 
energy investment specialist Matthew Simmons (2006) who argued that the oil and 
gas system lacked spare capacity and any minor incident in the industry was likely to 
cause a major crisis. Also supporting this was The World Energy Council (WEC, 
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2007), which suggested that we were in the Second Half of the Age of Oil, 
characterised by the decline of supply. 
Using research into new discoveries Chris Skrebowski’s Mega Projects (2004) 
observed a decline in large new discoveries of oil putting 2007-2008 as the peak 
point. With updated research he amended this to after 2010 (Skrebowski, 2005). 
 
Table 2: Summary of Dates for Early Peak 
Peak Oil date Source and Date of forecast 
2005 Deffeyes (2010)  
Hallock (2013) 
2006–2007 Bakhtiari (2004)  
2006 on Simmons (2006)  
After 2007 Skrebowski (2004) 
Soon after 2007 World Energy Council (2007)  
2009-2031 Sorrell et al (2009) 
Before 2010 Goodstein (2004)  
Around 2010 Campbell (2005)   
Possibly 2010 Klare (2004) 
2010 Aleklett et al (2010) 
After 2010 Skrebowski (2005)  
2006-2017 Hiro (2007)  
Soon after 2010 De Margerie, C., Total S.A. (Walt, 2010) 
2008-2012 De Almeida and Silva (2009)  
2012-2017 Koppelaar (2005 and 2006)  
2008–2018 Robelius (2007)  
2014 Sami Nashawi, I., Malallah, A. and Al-Bisharah  M. (2010) 
2015 Shell (2008) 
Sources: varied given in references 
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This matched the findings of a number of observers such as Klare (2004), who 
considered total historical global reserves half gone at 2010, and Hiro (2007), using 
data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (BP, 2006) to argue for a twin-
crested peak from 2006 to 2017. Goodstein (2004) perceived a situation similar to 
the 1973 oil crises causing him to propose 2010 as the peak date. These researchers 
tended to concur with one of the key advocates of early peak, Dr. Colin Campbell of 
the Association for the Study of Peak Oil and gas (ASPO). Writing since the 1990s 
on the topic he used data from the Gulf War, and Shell's restating of its reserves, to 
support 2010 as peak date in his book Oil Crisis (2005). His more recent research 
put the global economy now at ‘peak demand’ (Lewis, 2010).  
Further supporting this Christophe De Margerie, CEO of the oil firm Total, 
suggested that oil supplies could not easily cover demand after 2010, costing 
increasing amounts to recover (Walt, 2010). This also matched the research of 
Aleklett et al (2010), who looked at IEA’s data and agreed with 2010. De Almeida 
and Silva (2009) concluded that market participants (including oil firms) expected a 
peak from 2008 to 2012 based on a study of oil futures. 
The analysis of 47 major oil producing countries by Sami Nashawi et al (2010) 
estimated the world’s crude oil reserves and remaining recoverable oil, giving (an 
estimated) peak in 2014. Koppelaar (2005 and 2006) concluded that world liquids 
would peak around 2012 then plateau from 2010 to 2016, possibly peaking again 
later at 2017 if recovery rates improved. Robelius (2007) put the range from 2008 to 
2018 using four different predictive models.  
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In Shell’s energy scenarios to 2050 (2008) the firm mentioned oil supply ‘struggling 
to keep pace’ and gave a date of 2015, a specific figure absent in later publications.  
Covering many of these dates was the UKERC’s Global Oil Depletion assessment 
cautiously stating 2009-2031 (Sorrell et al, 2009). 
This gives a range of dates from 2005 from the earliest early-peak advocate to 
‘never’ from the most optimistic late-peak advocate. 
 
5. Reserve variations  
One aspect of the debates about the peak of conventional supplies revolves around 
the size and quality of reserves available. There are different ways to categorise 
these, usually using the proved, probable and possible classifications.  
EIA defines proved reserves as ‘the estimated quantities that geological and 
engineering data indicate can be recovered in future years from known reservoirs, 
assuming existing technology and current economic and operating conditions’ 
(2010, p37).  These proved reserves (1P) are often used for financial purposes with a 
‘reasonably likely’ chance of being produced, often 90% probability, though this can 
vary and is not usually mentioned. Additionally most of the proven oil is in countries 
where information is provided by state monopolies, which need not necessarily 
comply with industry procedures (Mitchell, 2004).  
Probable reserves are those that are likely to be produced using current or imminent 
technology, assuming favourable economic and political factors. These are not yet 
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proven but have over 50% chance of being developable, sometimes being called P50 
reserves (UK DECC, 2010). When combined with proved they are known as proved 
plus probable or 2P.  
Possible reserves are generally those with a 10 percent certainty of being developed 
(P10) under favourable circumstances
2
. These are often used for 3P measures, 
indicating proved plus probable plus possible reserves (Graefe, 2009). 
Obviously the assumptions on current technology and market conditions and the 
different bases of these measures give variations in results and may cause confusion. 
Observers can look at the same fields using different definitions and come up with 
dissimilar figures (Owen et al, 2010). Therefore there are concerns that firms and 
countries may inadvertently, or intentionally, over-report, under-report or leave 
estimates unchanged for years (Campbell, 2003). Sometimes reserve statistics may 
be adjusted from 1P to 2P giving an apparent increase in the field size with no real 
change in the oil available. Consequently it could be argued that proved and 
probable reserves may give better estimates of reserves, though these are 
infrequently used (Bentley et al, 2007). Even if firms and countries adhere to the 
same classifications the figures are only probability-based estimates with inherent 
assumptions about technology, operating conditions and the economic situation. If 
any of these factors should change, the results can be significantly revised with the 
real reserve quantity unaffected (Höök, 2010). Changes of this nature can be seen 
with BP (2012) and WEC (2010) figures growing over time. 
                                                
2
 Possible reserves are those which cannot be presently regarded as probable and are estimated to 
have less than 50% chance of being technically and commercially producible (UK DECC, 2010) 
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CERA states that flow rates are more important than reserve sizes but their research 
still gives a global reserve figure of 3740bn barrels (CERA, 2006). In their database 
of new field developments they consider the location of these, looking at 350 
projects with contributions of 7.5mbd to future supplies (CERA, 2008). Similarly 
EIA (2010) is optimistic that oil discoveries off the West African coast will bolster 
non-OPEC reserves, based on the assessment by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 
2010), estimating mean-undiscovered resources of over 71 billion barrels of oil, 
though they state this is a P3 figure (less than 50% chance), with 21 billion barrels 
being P1 (95% likely).  
Cohen (2006) criticises CERA’s use of assumptions on undiscovered resources and 
notes that conventional oil discoveries have declined since the 1960s, echoing 
Deffeyes (2010) who disputes the importance of such finds, proposing that 95 
percent of global oil reserves have already been found. Höök et al (2009) argue that 
even if such figures are realistic they do not balance the collapse in large fields. 
Bentley (2007) and Höök (2010) observe that many of these supposed discoveries 
are often due to moving from 1P to 2P measures.  
In addition to variations in the methodology, with inadvertent discrepancies, there 
are political and financial pressures to misreport figures. This has led to 
contradictory estimates (University of Oxford, 2010). For example, OPEC quotas 
are set at a percentage of reserves so there is motivation to exaggerate figures to 
benefit flow rates and therefore income.  As can be seen in Table 3 the claimed 
proved conventional oil reserves figures of Middle East OPEC Member countries 
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increased by around 360 billion barrels between 1984 and 2011 (nearly 85%) despite 
constant production.  
 
Table 3: Middle East Oil Reserves (billion barrels) 
 1984 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Change 
11/84 
(%) 
IR Iran 58.9 138. 4 136. 2 137.6 137.0 151.2 154.6 162.5 
Iraq 65.0 115.0 115.0 115.0 115.0 143.1 141.4 117.5 
Kuwait 92.7 101.5 101.5 101.5 101.5 101.5 101.5 9.5 
Qatar 4.5 26.2 25.1 25.4 25.4 25.4 25.4 464.4 
Saudi 
Arabia 
171.7 264. 3 264.2 264.1 264.5 264.5 265.4 54.6 
UAE 32.5 97.8 97.8 97.8 97.8 97.8 97.8 200.9 
Total 425.3 478.9 739.8 741.4 741.2 783.5 786.1 84.8 
Source: BP (2005) and OPEC (2012)  
Highlighting problems with OPEC data, internal Kuwaiti documents state that actual 
proven reserves are nearer 24 billion barrels that the 100 suggested (PIW, 2006). 
Simmons (2005), Graefe (2009) and Micu (2010) also challenge Saudi Arabia’s 
figures, arguing they may be overestimated and could peak soon. This is supported 
by the surprising increases in reserves from 165 billion barrels in 1982 to 260 in 
1989, a rise of 57%, and the region’s total reserves rising from 388 billion barrels to 
663 in the same period, an increase of 70.7% (OPEC, 2006). Hans Jud of 
Emeuerbare Energien suggests Saudi reserves are around 170 billion barrels (with 
40-50 billion remaining) and ex-ARAMCO staff such as Obaid Nawaf and Sadad 
Al-Husseini believe Saudi Arabia has been near maximum output since 2006  
(Barbir, 2008). 
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Although some small part of this can be attributed to discoveries and changes in 
methods of estimating reservoirs, there are fears that Saudi oil reserves (and others) 
may have been overestimated by at least 40%. This, admits Sadad Al-Husseini, may 
have added 300bn barrels to reserve size (Vidal, 2011), a figure that almost matches 
the increases in OPEC members' reserves in the 1980s, representing around a quarter 
of all reported reserves in 2007 (Bentley et al, 2007). These OPEC figures feed into 
to those of BP (2012) suggesting any errors will impact on global estimates. 
Table 4: OPEC members and reserves (1984 and 2011) 
OPEC member 1984 Proven crude 
oil reserves 
(billion barrels) 
2011 Proven crude oil 
reserves (billion barrels) 
% of OPEC 
reserves (billion 
barrels) 
Algeria 9.0 12.20  1.0 
Angola 2.1 9.50  0.8 
Ecuador 1.1 7.21  0.6 
Iran  58.9 151.17  12.7 
Iraq  65 143.10  12.0 
Kuwait  92.7 101.50  8.5 
Libya  21.4 47.10  3.9 
Nigeria  16.7 37.20  3.1 
Qatar  4.5 25.38  2.1 
Saudi Arabia  171.7 264.52  22.2 
UAE 32.5 97.80  8.2 
Venezuela* 28 (296.50)  (24.8) 
*of which Orinoco 
belt extra-heavy oil 
- 220 18.4 
Total 503.6 1 193.17 100 
Sources: BP (2005) and OPEC (2011)  
At best Saudi reserves are seen as near maturity (Hiro, 2007). Evidence of this is that 
7 million barrels of sea water are being injected daily into the main field, Ghawar. 
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This is a technique for maintaining pressure and providing oil faster but it can limit 
ultimate recovery and cause rapid depletion, especially with older fields (Morton, 
2006).  
Saudi Arabia is critical to OPEC production, having the second largest resources 
after Venezuela (table 4).  However Venezuela’s figure has also increased adding 
nearly 270 billion barrels since 1984, including ‘proven reserves of the Magna 
Reserve Project in the Orinoco Belt, which amounted to 94.1 billion barrels in 2008’ 
(OPEC, 2008, p17), all of this being extra-heavy oil (Graefe, 2009) the remaining 
126 billion barrels in BP’s data being ‘based on OPEC Secretariat and government 
announcements,’ (BP, 2012, p6). 
OPEC reserves are vital to global oil, contributing 72.4%: therefore non-OPEC 
countries only making up 27.6% (BP, 2012). Of these Canada is the biggest non-
OPEC producer due to figures recently revised to account for oil-tar sands (table 5), 
pushing up the global figure from 2001 by nearly 175 billion barrels (and the 
Canadian figure has been backdated -1991 now showing over 40 billion barrels, not 
less than 8 billion). 
The Russian federation is still the biggest conventional-oil producer, making up 
almost half of the non-tar-sands reserves according to BP’s data. However, Russia 
declared all oil data a state secret in 2004 (WEC, 2007) making it difficult to 
accurately predict what remains, with estimates varying. Oil & Gas Journal 
estimates 60 billion barrels for both end-2008 and end-2009 (Radler, 2010) whereas 
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WEC adopted the BP estimated figure of 77.4bn barrels for 2010 (BP, 2011)
3
. This 
is critical as EIA expects Russian output to increase from 9.4 million barrels per day 
in 2016 to 12.8 million barrels per day in 2035, with future potential for 15.7 million 
barrels per day (EIA, 2010). Meng and Bentley (2008) stated that Russia oil reserves 
were past their peak with output rising only slightly to 10.38 million barrels a day in 
2012 despite high prices (Rudnitsky, 2013).  
Table 5: Significant non-OPEC Reserves  
Country 1991 
billion  
barrels 
2001 
billion  
barrels 
2010 
billion 
barrels 
2011 
billion 
barrels 
Share of 
global 
Total 
Reserve/ 
Production 
ratio 
US  32.1  30.4  30.9  30.9 1.9%  10.8 
Canada*  (40.1)  (180.9)  (175.2)  (175.2) (10.6%)  (Over 100) 
*Of which oil-
tar sands 
32.4 174.7 169.2 169.2   
Mexico  50.9  18.8  11.7  11.4 0.7%  10.6 
Brazil  4.8  8.5  14.2  15.1 0.9%  18.8 
Azerbaijan  n/a  1.2  7.0  7.0 0.4%  18.5 
Kazakhstan  n/a  5.4  30.0  30.0 1.8%  44.7 
Norway  8.8  11.6  6.8  6.9 0.4%  9.2 
Russian 
Federation  
n/a  73.0  86.6  88.2 5.3%  23.5 
Oman  4.3  5.9  5.5  5.5 0.3%  16.9 
Sudan  0.3  0.7  6.7  6.7 0.4%  40.5 
China  15.5  15.4 14.8 14.7 0.9% 9.9 
India  6.1 5.5 5.8 0.8 0.3% 18.2 
Total non-
OPEC  
204.7 330.4 329.4 329.4 19.9% 26.3 
Source: BP (2012) 
                                                
3
 Rising to 88.2 billion barrels in 2011(BP, 2012) 
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If Russian data is inaccurate this will support OPEC’s position as the key provider of 
oil, putting further pressure on Saudi Arabian and Venezuelan reserves.  
Consequently reserve data is hampered by different measures, the interpretation of 
figures and political pressures to adjust or construe statistics to favour a particular 
standpoint. Interestingly, if global reserves are over-estimated, as proposed by some 
early-peak advocates, this suggests that oil prices are artificially lower than should 
be and markets and politicians are being denied information vital for energy policy 
decisions. 
6. More complex fossil fuels 
Another part of the argument put forward by the late-peak advocates is that even if 
reserve sizes are optimistic, improved technology will provide better extraction of 
present fields and allow new hydrocarbon fuel sources to be efficiently accessed, 
counterbalancing declining stocks.   EIA (2010, p23) argues that high oil prices will 
encourage ‘the use of enhanced oil recovery technologies to increase production of 
conventional resources’. They maintain that increases in market prices may promote 
the economical development of these and unconventional resources which are seen 
as a likely source of future fuel by BP (Macalister, 2010).  
Leonardo Maugeri (2012), building on his earlier work (Maugeri, 2010 and 2004), 
proposes that the concept of Peak Oil is flawed because it ignores such technological 
advances. This reinforces comments by Peter Jackson of CERA (2006) arguing that 
the main flaw in Peak Oil theory is its failure to consider increasing reserves due to 
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exploration and technology, suggesting that the harder to extract sources are part of 
the solution, cushioning supply shortages. These maybe be tight oil, ultra-deep-water 
or near-oils such as oil shale (as opposed to tight oil from shale), oil-tar sands and 
extra heavy oil. Indeed these predictions have been seen to have bearing on North 
American production with hydraulic fracturing (fracking) and Canadian oil-tar sands 
pushing reserve figures and production levels to the highest for many years (EIA, 
2013). 
However important these developments are, they do not change the central argument 
of Peak Oil and Maugeri’s earlier research has been criticised for making some 
incorrect assumptions about technology and unconventional oil and not setting it in 
the broader context of oil-peaking calculations (Meng and Bentley, 2008). His later 
work has also been extensively discredited by Jean Laherrere (2012) in two 
comprehensive analyses of ‘errors in facts and analysis’ supported by a range of 
observers, many in the industry. Deffeyes (2010) observed that exploring existing 
fields may yield deposits but this will not offset the global peak that he believes 
occurred in 2005. Even Maugeri acknowledges that ‘our planet most likely does not 
hide many more gigantic basins of conventional oil, for which discovery peaked in 
the 1960s’ (Maugeri, 2012, p14).  
The Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico has also shown the risks with 
extraction in difficult conditions.  Canadian oil-tar sands pose their own political and 
procedural problems and there are concerns as to how recoverable this resource is, 
with only around 15% of available deposits being developed (BP, 2012). 
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Additionally, both these and Venezuelan heavy oils have cost complications due to 
the low Energy Returns On Investment (EROI), typically 5:1 as opposed to 
conventional oil’s 40:1 (Cobb, 2012), and have significant environmental 
externalities when exploited. 
Furthermore, data on reserves of many unconventional sources are now regarded as 
optimistic (Kling, 2013), compounded by thermodynamic inefficiencies in the 
processes, often relying on high energy inputs, will ultimately limit the net gain to 
provide fuel quantities well below predicted figures (Cohen, 2006). Generally, the 
slow refinement rate for many unconventional sources prevents them being rapidly 
deployed to make up shortfalls in conventional oil and limits usefulness (De 
Almedia and Silva, 2009). As noted  by the World Energy Council ‘time is running 
out to prove that newly discovered fields and new technology can more than 
compensate for flagging production from the rapidly aging fields beyond OPEC’ 
(WEC, 2011, p18). 
As well as exploiting oil from such locations, there are methods to produce liquid 
fuel from other sources. Gas-to-liquids (GTL) or coal-to-liquids (CTL) technologies 
offer means to manufacture synthetic oil from alternative hydrocarbon reserves. 
CTL is seen as a method that will allow countries with extensive coal deposits to 
prolong oil resources and also secure domestic supplies. It has been piloted at a 
number of US plants and there is interest in the technology from China, South Africa 
and a number of countries in the Far East (Smith et al, 2008).  
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However the contribution to liquid fuel supply is limited due to the processing 
methods which cannot compare with the flexibility of conventional oil refining, 
therefore preventing CTL becoming a viable alternative to oil (Hook and Aleklett, 
2010). CTL has previously only been used in situation of abundant coal reserves and 
oil shortages
4
, due to energy loses in production. Also the process considerably 
increase global CO2 emissions, causing political difficulties with countries 
attempting to comply with greenhouse gas agreements, and will put pressure on 
solid fuel reserves which are increasingly being used for electricity generation 
(Bharadwaj et al, 2007). Indeed, although world reserves of coal in 2011 were 
sufficient to meet 112 years of global production they had fallen from the 2000 
figure of 210 years suggesting consumption is already increasing excessively 
without further requirements on stocks using an inefficient fuel production method 
(BP, 2012).  
GTL is an existing technology with potential to produce usable fuel, also reducing 
waste by converting gas that is currently flared in oil production into usable fuel. But 
this process is costly and difficult, with the potential of over a third of the energy 
content being wasted in the process (Maggio and Cacciola, 2009). There are also 
wider issues with natural gas supply which will face greater usage for electricity 
generation and heating as oil reserves reduce. Even without GTL or increased 
consumption for other uses, there is a suggestion that gas supply will peak around 
2040 (EIA, 2010) possibly running out in 2069 at present consumption (eni, 2011).  
                                                
4
 Noteworthy being South Africa and Nazi Germany   
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Consequently these methods are of minimal benefit, requiring high levels of 
investment, high energy inputs and performing poorly on environmental measures 
(Graefe, 2009). 
A less contentious source is NGL which is proposed as making make up much of the 
shortfall in conventional supplies. NGL is the liquid portion of natural gas, 
recovered in processing and often blended with crude oil. Shell (2011), IEA (2011), 
BP (Macalister, 2010) and Ged Davis (2003) believe NGL and near-oils will 
possibly preventing peaking until after 2050.  
Even NGL is not without its own shortcomings, the foremost ones being that many 
producers include it in reserve figures at present so it is not an additional resource, 
suggesting unsupported optimism about recovery and efficient conversion into 
useable liquid fuel (Graefe, 2009). It would also appear to be likely to peak in 
production at a similar time to oil, therefore providing little support to liquid fuel 
reserves (Maggio and Cacciola, 2009).  
7. Non-fossil alternatives to oil 
Those who argue against the theory of Peak Oil point out that renewables and other 
alternative sources will phase in as oil prices increase, ensuring oil output does not 
peak. IEA (2008) assumes a high level of adoption of low carbon technologies for 
their 450 Scenario with oil peaking just before 2020. Adherence to efficiency 
measures for the New Policies Scenario, where oil is predicted not to peak before 
2035, sees nuclear power grow from 6% in 2008 to 8% of global energy in 2035 
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(IEA, 2010). The suggestion is the 2020 peak would come from reduced demand not 
supply with the 450 Scenario.  
Shell (2008, 2011) offers its own scenarios titled Blueprint and Scramble. The 
former sees an increasing rate of renewable adoption whereas the latter envisions an 
attempt to continue with present production and consumption patterns. Within their 
research they identify supply shortages for both conventional oil and gas by 2020, 
though they make no specific mention of Peak Oil. Ged Davis’ date for Peak Oil 
‘after 2025’ is based on earlier Shell scenarios with comparable assumptions (Shell, 
2001). In the later In the New Lens Scenarios (Shell, 2013), renewables reach a 30–
nearly 40% of total energy by 2060 in both their Mountains and Oceans scenarios, 
with a suggestion of 60–70% provision later in the century. 
Also there has been much publicity given to the International Panel on Climate 
Change prediction of up to 77% of global energy being supplied by renewable 
sources by 2050 (IPCC, 2011) 
7.1 Biofuels 
A significant part of the renewable energy mix is biofuel which has emerged as 
direct alternative to liquid fossil fuels. There are a range of different types of this 
fuel ranging from bioalcohols, biodiesel, green diesel and vegetable oil to bioethers, 
biogas and syngas as well as traditional biomass (Demirbas, 2009). Most research is 
into the liquids and gases that can be utilised as replacements to conventional oil, 
consequently there has been considerable interest in production of bioalcohols and 
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biodiesel/green diesel with crops being grown specifically for these products. CERA 
(Jackson, 2006) sees biofuels as an important part of the future liquid-energy mix 
with BP suggesting ‘second generation’ crops could provide 10% of global petrol by 
2020 (Macalister, 2010).  
Despite technological improvements, there has been little adoption of biofuels, only 
accounting for 16% of global energy final consumption with over 60% of this being 
traditional biomass used for heating and cooking (REN, 2011). Similarly Hirsch et al 
(2005) observe the small volumes supplied, with roughly half of one percent of 
global energy produced from this source (table 6). Even Maugeri (2010) accepts that 
if the whole crop of U.S. maize were turned into biofuels, it would only supply about 
5 percent of U.S. oil demand. This further reflects concerns about the cultivation of 
these fuels impacting on land use and food production (Penuelas and Carnicer, 
2010). Also, since all palm-oil production is based in tropical regions of the 
developing world, there are worries about loss of endangered species, increased 
greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation (Carvalho, 2011). This has resulted in 
biofuels coming under attack from environmental and conservation groups with a 
decline in political support for subsidies and plateauing of output (BP, 2012). 
 
7.2. Hydro, wind and others 
Hydro-electric is the most successful of the renewable energy sources, contributing 
2.3% of global power (IPCC, 2011). There was a rise in consumption of this power 
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production increase of 6.5% (table 6). Unlike some other renewable energies it tends 
to be economically viable and the construction costs are often offset against low 
long-term costs and spin-off uses for the reservoirs such as for domestic and 
industrial water supplies, irrigation, recreation and flood prevention. 
Table 6: Global Energy Consumption, 2009, 2010 and 2011  
 2009  
Million Tonnes  
Oil Equivalent 
% 2010 
Million Tonnes  
Oil Equivalent 
% 2011 
Million Tonnes  
Oil Equivalent 
% 
Oil 3908.7 34.4 4028.1 33.6 4059.1 33.1 
NG 2661.4 23.4 2858.1 23.8 2905.6 23.7 
Coal 3305.6 29.1 3555.8 29.6 3724.3 30.3 
Nuclear 614 5.4 626.2 5.2 599.3 4.9 
Hydroelectric 736.3 6.5 775.6 6.5 791.5 6.4 
Renewables 137.4 1.2 158.6 1.3 194.8 1.6 
Biofuel12 51.8 (0.5) 58.4 (0.5) 58.9 (0.5) 
Total 11363.2  12002.4  12274.6  
Source: BP 2012 
1Production data. 2Also in Renewables. 
However, there are limited sites that such facilities can be located and concerns have 
been raised about the impact on eco-systems from flooding land and the siltation of 
feed rivers. There has also been evidence of high greenhouse gas emissions
5
 from 
tropical reservoirs, sometimes matching fossil-fuelled power stations (Graham-
Rowe, 2005). The effects on communities and fear of catastrophic failure can also 
cause political resistance so that even when there are geographically suitable 
locations, dams may not be constructed (Bosshard, 2008). Therefore hydro-electric 
schemes cannot be seen as a solution capable of unbounded growth and it may be 
that the limits of this energy source may soon be approached.  
                                                
5
 From methane, a significant greenhouse gas with greater potent than carbon dioxide 
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A technology nearer its early stages of development is wind power. This saw 
increased uptake of over 22% in 2010, notably in China and the US where there was 
70% of global growth (BP, 2011). A number of countries have already achieved 
relatively high levels of wind power, such as 21% of stationary electricity 
production in Denmark, 18% in Portugal, 16% in Spain and 9% in Germany 
(WWEA, 2010). Offshore wind power is seen as the focus for future development, 
accessing higher wind speeds compared to land-based facilities and reducing visual 
impact. Generally there are fewer effects on the environment from this power source 
from any other method (GWEC, 2011). 
However wind power accounts for a tiny part of power production, being only 2.5% 
of world electricity output (WWEA, 2010). Indeed total non-hydro renewable 
energy only accounted for 1.6% of total global-energy consumption in 2011 (BP, 
2012). Wind power is also unreliable (being weather dependent), being highly 
susceptible to geography and climate with much lower capacity than claimed 
(Jefferson, 2012a). Even Denmark’s healthy figure corresponds to output but not 
consumption with much having to be exported, sometimes sold for zero return when 
there is little demand (Techconsult, 2007). Additionally, land-based systems often 
face local resistance and rely on conventional generation to back up supply (Le Pair, 
2011).  
7.3. Nuclear 
Another existing element of alternative energy is nuclear power, claimed by some to 
experience a ‘renaissance’, with growth of 2% between 2009 and 2010, much of this 
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being in Europe, particularly France (BP, 2011). Rising fossil fuel prices and 
greenhouse gas emission limits drove some of this, as did the promise of 
uninterrupted domestic electricity and national energy security at times of global 
unrest (World Nuclear Association, 2011). With the development of cleaner and 
safer thorium reactors the opportunities would seem to be greater than ever (Greaves 
et al, 2012) 
But usage has not increased as predicted. This has been due to reluctance to commit 
to major projects because of the poor economic performance against coal or natural 
gas, on-going concerns about the disposal of waste and worries about weapon 
development (Bezdek, 2009). The 2011 earthquake in Japan highlighted the 
implications of incidents, raising the long-running question of safety and causing the 
cancellation of many programmes, with some countries abandoning this form of 
energy all together (Breidthardt, 2011). At best, concerns about nuclear accidents 
have reduced long–term investment in this technology, delayed projects or diverted 
investment into other energy systems (O'Donnell, 2011). Adding to this is the unease 
about declining global stocks of uranium, especially if a number of nations are to 
adopt fission as a major energy source (Bardi, 2009). Even thorium fuelling has 
technical and safety concerns, still requiring significant investment and the support 
of conventional reactors for fuel (Mathieu et al, 2006). 
Consequently nuclear and alternative fuels show no signs of being developed in 
sufficient quantities or with the vigour required to rapidly replace conventional oil 
supplies.  
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The predictions for renewables in particular have to be viewed with caution. The 
IPCC’s 77% statistic for 2050 has to be read as one of a range of scenarios with that 
particular figure requiring major policy changes and high levels of innovation 
(IPCC, 2011). Aleklett et al (2010) see IEA’s production projections as being 
significantly overstated with the IEA accepting that government support and 
measures to improve cost-effectiveness are needed for the anticipated growth in 
renewables (IEA, 2010). Even Shell’s detailed analysis, the result of complex 
scenarios built on earlier pioneering work (Jefferson, 2012b), has a positive bias 
towards the renewables uptake.  Therefore the evidence is that none of these 
technologies are being developed or invested in with sufficient enthusiasm to 
quickly replace even a reasonable portion of the energy supplied by oil. 
8. Complicating issue: the rising demand for oil 
As well as considerations of supply and alternatives to conventional oil there is 
increasing demand putting pressure on reserves (table 7). Much of this has been 
driven by the growth of the global economy in the last 40 years (EIA, 2009). This 
has partially been due to the continued consumption in the developed world but 
exasperated by increased demand from China and India.  
2011 global demand was 88 million barrels per day (32 132 million barrels per year) 
which was an increase of nearly 15% over the 2000 figure (BP, 2012). Indeed since 
the mid 1980s consumption has grown at an average rate of over 1% a year, despite 
the impact of recessions in 1990 and 2001 (EIA, 2009). At this rate of growth, it is 
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suggested that by 2030 the world may consume 42 500 million barrels per year 
(Owen et al, 2010).  
 
Table 7: growth in oil consumption for China and India 2001 -2011 
Million 
barrels 
daily  
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 % of 
global 
total 
China 4.86 5.26 5.77 6.74 6.94 7.44 7.82 7.94 8.20 9.05 9.75 11.4 
India 2.29 2.38 2.42 2.57 2.57 2.57 2.84 3.07 3.21 3.32 3.47 4.0 
World 77.3 78.3 79.8 82.8 84.1 85 86.4 86 84.7 87.4 88.03 100 
Source: BP 2012  
However if global reserves soon peak in output and the world economy faces a 
situation of insufficient supply to meet present needs then the only response to such 
an increase in consumption will be through rising prices. Considering the impact of a 
3% fall in output on prices in 1970s with the oil crises, it can be seen that a potential 
shortfall of 10 000 million barrels will have catastrophic consequences, with 
suggestions of a ‘near doubling, permanently, of real oil prices over the coming 
decade’ (Benes et al, 2012, p17). This huge hike in costs would undoubtedly result 
in a major global recession (Barsky and Kilian, 2004). 
However late-peak advocates, such as Maugeri and to some extent CERA, suggest 
the price mechanism will act to stimulate supply causing greater exploration and 
exploitation of expensive resources to match demand. This would maintain output, 
but at an increased market price thereby making alternative sources economically 
viable and experiencing a growth in investment.  
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Unfortunately this takes no account of the impact of prices on the wider economy, as 
oil is not an easily substituted commodity. Being the main transport fuel and a 
critical source of energy and chemical constituents, any large price rise would have 
dire consequences, choking economic growth without any encouragement for 
investment in new technologies and risk taking (Tyerberg, 2012).  
Indeed this has been a critical factor in recent years as the financial crisis and 
slowdown, combined with euphoria over oil shale, has seen a fall in oil prices. 
Without significant real changes in oil supplies or fuel sources the global price has 
reduced, leading to little discussion of Peak Oil, especially when many countries 
have been occupied with what are seen as more pressing problems related to debt 
and poor growth. Dealing with long-term energy questions has been secondary to 
such concerns, with politicians ignoring the link between financial and energy 
markets with the potential to trigger major geopolitical incidents (El Gamal and 
Jaffe, 2009)   
9. Conclusion 
Opinions on Peak Oil vary greatly but the key question is whether it is a critical 
issue or not. Many of the variations in perspective can be blamed on interpretation of 
figures and incentives for under or overestimating data. Balaban and Tsatskin (2010) 
point out the importance of Peak Oil predictors’ values which may encourage 
commentators to over or underreport reserve sizes to justify a certain argument. 
Therefore those who believe it has already occurred or is imminent give data to 
suggest this, often providing a definite date. They have motivation to push for debate 
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on the issue of Peak Oil, often being critics of the oil industry or doubtful as to the 
ability of governments to think strategically about energy.  
Similarly the Peak Oil doubters supply figures and counter arguments for their own 
positions, tending to criticise the theory from three perspectives. Firstly, that reserve 
estimates show sufficient oil for decades of high output production, irrespective of 
inconsistencies in the data. Secondly, that technological solutions will ensure that 
conventional fields yield a higher percentage of oil than was previously possible 
whilst non-conventional sources will be developed economically. And thirdly, 
alternative energy will be increasingly adopted and gradually replace oil, eased by 
the use of gas as a lower-carbon intermediary. 
All three positions are supported by market forces, incentivising the development of 
unconventional oil and alternative energy when conventional reserves do prove 
inadequate. Some dispute the approach to Peak Oil whilst others see it as irrelevant, 
discrediting the Peak Oil theorists to such an extent that the discussion becomes 
polarised and simplified. 
But the evidence is that conventional oil production has peaked and prices will rise, 
though this is unlikely to benignly encourage a shift to new fuels. The modern global 
economy has been built on cheap energy and history shows that high oil prices will 
have a serious negative affect on already weak growth and trade. Although 
alternative energy sources are being developed there is little evidence that 
renewables will be able to replace even a small percentage of oil's provision, while 
nuclear is hampered by safety fears and low investment. 
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Rather than continuing to argue for or against the topic, Peak Oil should be 
acknowledged as part of a complex energy situation with the realisation that cheap 
fuel is no longer available and we now face circumstances where prices will increase 
and high energy-based growth will be limited.  
With this acceptance, and while there still is sufficient oil, there should be 
investment in new energy sources. The role of nuclear power needs to be properly 
evaluated and the effectiveness of different forms of renewables assessed. Serious 
discussion is required on ways to reduce energy usage at production, distribution and 
consumption phases of the economy, using more than short-term tax inducements. 
Moreover, this should not be about ad-hoc market based solution. Like the oil crisis 
of the 1970s, this is a situation of great importance that requires leadership, 
discussion and analysis on a global level. Many aspects of modern life will be 
impacted by conventional oil output falling and co-ordinated action between diverse 
agents will be required.  
As noted in Shell’s New Lens Scenarios, quoting an old African proverb, ‘to go fast, 
go alone – but to go far, go together’ (Shell, 2013, p7).    
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